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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH , : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
CARLOS MENDEZ, : Case No. 20030617-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty by the Defendant 
to the charge of Riot, a third-degree felony. The plea of guilty was taken before the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon on the 5th day of December 2002. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA? 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for appeal by 
the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 29), and hearings and a ruling on 
that motion (R. 49). 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. 
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." The Court applies "the clearly erroneous 
standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." 
State v. Benvemito, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). "However, the ultimate question 
of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural 
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Benvemito, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). 
POINT II 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND 
TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY HIS 
ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE. 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was presented for 
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 29), and hearings and 
a ruling on that motion (R. 49). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter 
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was ineffective. 
The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION 
Forth Amcmlmnil 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
i 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not 
be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 16-9-101. Riot — Penalties. 
(1) A person is guilty of riot if: 
(a) Simultaneously with two or more other persons he engages in tumultuous or 
violent conduct and thereby knowingly or recklessly creates a substantial risk of 
causing public alarm; or 
A 
(b) He assembles with two or more other persons with the purpose of engaging, soon 
thereafter, in tumultuous or violent conduct, knowing, that two or more other persons 
in the assembly have the same purpose; or 
(c) He assembles with two or more other persons with the purpose of committing an 
offense against a person or property of another who he supposes to be guilty of a 
violation of law, believing that two or more other persons in the assembly have the 
same purpose. 
(2) Any person who refuses to comply with a lawful order to withdraw given to him 
immediately prior to, during, or immediately following a violation of Subsection (1) is 
guilty of riot. It is no defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (2) that 
withdrawal must take place over private property; provided, however, that no persons 
so withdrawing shall incur criminal or civil liability by virtue of acts reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the withdrawal. 
(3) Riot is a felony of the third degree if, in the course of and as a result of the 
conduct, any person suffers bodily injury, or substantial property damage, arson 
occurs or the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601; otherwise it is a class B misdemeanor. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11(e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
s 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and 
if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the 
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If 
the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the 
statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into 
or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to enable the 
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
£ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 19, 2002, the Defendant was charged with the offense of Riot, a 
third degree felony in violation of UCA § 76-9-101, (R. 01). On December 5, 2002 
the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and was arraigned on the charge by the 
court (R. 17). The Defendant pled guilty to the charge on December 5, 2002 and, on 
January 9, 2003, was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison not 
to exceed 5 years (R. 19, 20). The Defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea on January 14, 2003, and the court, after oral argument denied that motion 
on July 10, 2003 (R. 49). The Defendant filed a notice of appeal on July 30, 2003 (R. 
41). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 19, 2002, the Defendant was charged with the offense of Riot, a 
third degree felony in violation of UCA § 76-9-101, (R. 01). On December 5, 2002 
the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and was arraigned on the charge by the 
court (R. 17). At that time, the Defendant entered into a plea negotiation wherein he 
pled guilty to the offense of Riot, as charged in the information in exchange for the 
State agreeing, "not to file any other charges, including a murder charge they were 
considering." (R. 48 12). During the plea colloquy the prosecutor presented to the 
court a recitation of facts supporting the plea. The prosecutor stated that the Defendant 
was involved in a riot with additional facts as follows: 
7 
Mr. Mendez is one of the four individuals that was present [in an 
altercation]... that resulted in the death of Daniel Montgomery. But Mr. 
Mendez's particular involvement was that he acknowledged to Detective 
Zaccardi that he approached Mr. Montgomery in his vehicle and spoke 
to him that day prior to any altercation. And then Mr. Montgomery - and 
when his - Mr. Montgomery and his friends came back, Mr. Mendez 
was one of the four that was there. And that he pushed one of the 
individuals in the altercation that occurred afterwards. And there were 
also fingerprints on the car that were Mr. Mendez's. He was not one of 
the individuals that had a knife or a box cutter, but he was present with 
three other individuals and they engaged in the behavior that resulted in 
the death of Daniel Montgomery eventually. Mr. Mendez, frankly, was a 
little less culpable in the fact that he did not have a weapon and was on 
the other side of the vehicle when Mr. Montgomery got stabbed (R.48 / 
4,5). 
At the plea hearing the trial court went through all the elements as set forth by 
Rule 11. The court informed the Defendant the possible maximum sentence that he 
could receive by pleading guilty (R. 48 /3). He asked if the Defendant if he felt 
"pressured by anyone to enter a plea of guilty today?"(R. 48 /3). He asked if the 
Defendant's mind was clear and if he understood what he was doing (R. 48 /3). He 
informed the Defendant of his right to a presumption of innocence, and that the 
burden of proof was on the prosecutor to prove him guilty of each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 48 / 4). The trial court told the Defendant of his 
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, and his right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses (R. 48 / 4). The court additionally related to the Defendant 
his right to utilize the subpoena power of the court to compel witness for the defense 
as well as his right to testify or not to testify under the 5th amendment (R. 48 /4 ) . The 
trial court also told the Defendant that his appeal rights would be limited by a plea of 
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guilty, and that all the other rights explained would be forfeited by pleading guilty (R. 
48/4). 
The Defendant had reviewed a statement in advance of plea (R. 22-27), which 
the Defendant acknowledged reviewing with his counsel. He signed that document in 
open court on the day of the plea (R. 48 / 7). Finally the court and the Defendant had 
the following exchange: 
THE COURT: Before I take your plea, do you have any lingering questions 
that you want to ask Mr. Bouwhuis at this moment? 
(Off-the-record discussion between Mr. Bouwhuis and the Defendant.) 
THE DEFENDANT: No. (R. 46 / 7) 
The Defendant then entered his guilty plea to the charge of felony Riot (R. 48 / 7). 
The Defendant was then sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 5 
years on January 9, 2003 (R. 19, 20). The Defendant thereafter filed a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty on January 13, 2003 (R. 29). The Defendant did not file any 
supporting memorandum with the motion, and the State filed a two-page objection to 
the motion (R. 33). 
At the time of oral argument on the Defendant's motion, his new attorney 
related that the Defendant believed that he was improperly coerced into pleading 
guilty. He told his oral argument attorney that the only discussion he had with his plea 
attorney was "that there may be the potential of filing some kind of action against him 
o 
that involved him in that murder" (R. 49/2) . The Defendant told his oral argument 
attorney the following: 
[T]hat whole thing caused him so much fear and concern about - about 
what maybe could happen that he didn't feel like he was paying as good 
of attention as he needed to at the time he was going through this with 
his counsel Mr. Bouwhuis. He also indicates to [argument counsel] that 
he attempted to get Mr.Bouwhuis to get him copies of his police reports.1 
Oral argument counsel stated, " [t]he potential for being involved in a 
murder which he had nothing to do with and didn't want to even be 
associated with caused him a great amount of concern and — and fear 
when he got in the discussion about the plea. And that's why he jumped 
into this plea bargain, from his point of view" (R. 49 / 4). 
Finally, the Defendant argued that he did not have an opportunity to go through 
the police reports prior to the guilty plea (R. 49 /5). Based upon the fact that the trial 
court had gone through the elements set forth under Rule 11, the court denied the 
Defendants motion to withdraw his plea (R. 49 /6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant argues that under the constitutions of both the state and federal 
government as well as Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a Defendant 
cannot be forced to plead guilty. The requirement that a Defendant's plea must be 
voluntary has its basis in both constitutional and statutory law, as well as under the 
general principle of justice. In the present case the Defendant believes that these basic 
guarantees of justice were denied him. The Defendant felt pressured to enter a plea of 
1
 Oral argument counsel stated, "I don't show any note of [defendant's request for 
police reports] in the file until the prelim, which is actually when he entered the plea" 
(R. 49 / 2). 
1A 
guilty to a charge under a threat that the State would file a murder charge against him 
absent a plea. The Defendant pled at the time of the preliminary hearing despite the 
fact that he was asking for his police reports and had not discussed the same with 
defense counsel. 
The Defendant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel by the failure of his appointed counsel to provide him with police reports and 
by not adequately reviewing the evidence with the Defendant. 
While the Defendant acknowledges that the trial court reviewed with him the 
rights required under Rule 11, and further acknowledges that he reviewed and signed 
the statement in advance of plea, he believes that his plea was nevertheless coerced. 
The Defendant believes that his plea counsel did not adequately provide him with the 
police reports that were necessary for him to understand the evidence against him, or 
lack thereof. He also was unable to intelligently discuss the ramifications of pleading 
guilty versus going to trial with his trial counsel without this vital information. 
The Defendant understands that the Utah Appellate Courts have presumed that 
a Defendant has voluntarily entered a plea when the trial court complies with the 
required elements of Rule 11. The question as to whether or not the Defendant 
understood the evidence against him however is uncertain when he entered the plea at 
an early stage of the proceedings, and did so without the benefit of any documentary 
evidence. The Defendant is asking this Court to reverse the trial courts denial of his 
motion to withdraw his plea, and allow the Defendant to proceed to trial on the case. 
n 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
On December 5, 2002 the Defendant entered a guilty plea as charged to the 
first-degree felony murder charge. On or about January 14, 2003 the Defendant 
moved the trial court to allow him to withdraw that plea. The trial court thereafter held 
a hearing on the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. After that hearing, the trial 
court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
The Court in the case of State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) held that 
the appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard." The Court has further noted that it applies 
"the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in 
conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) 
"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 
1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)) 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure provides: 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
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The trial court therefore, must ensure that the Defendant is voluntarily entering 
his plea, and has a duty to ensure that the Defendant is not being coerced or pressured 
in any manner. A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to grant the motion to 
withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 violation is present. In the case of State v. 
Humphrey, 79 P.3d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) this Court held: 
In the past, we have held that Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure creates "a presumption the plea was entered voluntarily" and 
"good cause exists where the plea was entered involuntarily." State v. 
Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Thorup, we 
confirmed that compliance with Rule 11 is not dispositive in determining 
a motion to withdraw a plea. A defendant can show good cause by 
putting forth evidence that the plea was in fact involuntary. 
In the present case, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his plea, 
based on Rule 11 violations of voluntariness. 
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Riot, a third-degree 
felony, as charged in the original information. The plea negotiation process resulted 
in only one promise or supposed benefit to the Defendant by entering into the plea. 
The Defendant was promised that the prosecution would not file a possible murder 
charge against the Defendant. That single promise induced the Defendant to plead 
guilty, although the Defendant, at the time of the plea hearing had not even had an 
opportunity to review with his trial counsel the police reports that could have either 
supported or disproved that possible charge. 
In the case of State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the 
Court ruled that, "[bjoth the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
n 
allowed a Rule 11 challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be considered for the first 
time on appeal." Further, in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) the 
Supreme Court reversed a guilty plea holding: "It was error, plain on the face of the 
record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative 
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Although in the Boykin decision, the 
Court was presented with a plea to a then capital offense and the court taking the plea 
did not ask any questions regarding the plea, the fundamental principles are the same. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 
1274 (Utah 1988) held "Brady and Hammond2 require that in order for a plea to be 
voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the nature and value 
of any promises made to him." (emphasis added) In the Copeland decision, the Court 
remanded the case back to the trial court for further findings regarding the defendant's 
mental state and his understanding of the plea negotiation promises. However, the 
Court noted: 
There are several problems with the plea bargain entered into by 
defendant. First, it appears either that he misunderstood the promise the 
State made to him regarding its sentencing recommendation or that the 
promise was illusory. Second, and more serious, is the claim that 
defendant's understanding of the promise caused him to be misled about 
the sentencing options available to the court and therefore the value of 
the bargain into which he was entering. (Id. at 1274) 
2
 Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742 (1970) 
Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975) 
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In the present case, the Defendant clearly did not understand the plea 
negotiations. He had not reviewed the police reports to even determine for himself 
whether or not his involvement in the murder would arise to a level that could result in 
his conviction for that offense. Admittedly, the trial court asked the Defendant " do 
you have any lingering questions that you want to ask Mr. Bouwhuis at this moment?" 
to which the Defendant stated "no". The trial court also asked the Defendant if he felt 
pressured by anyone to enter his plea, to which the Defendant again responded in the 
negative. The complicating factor was that the Defendant felt pressure by the very 
counsel who was supposed to ensure that no pressure was present. 
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742 (1970), 
the United States Supreme Court held: 
ff[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to 
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless 
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), 
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238, 241 
(Utah Ct. App. 2002) reversed a defendant's conviction by guilty plea, when it 
determined: 
Both the trial court and the State clearly promised Norris that he could 
pursue a claim for vindictive prosecution on appeal, but neither the court 
nor the State could fulfill that promise. The court's legal error 
exaggerated the benefits Norris would receive from pleading guilty. 
1 ^ 
Thus it misled Norris as to "the nature and value of [the] promise[] made 
to him." (Quoting State v. Copeland at 1274.) 
The Court held: 'Thus, Norris's pleas were not made voluntarily with full 
knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty." (Id. at 241) 
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to establish the basic requirement of 
Rule 11, in that the court did not ensure that the plea was voluntarily taken. 
Specifically, the court, knowing that the only concession to the Defendant in the plea 
to the crime as charged in the original information was the promise by the prosecution 
not to file a murder charge, did not make an adequate record to ensure that the 
Defendant did in fact "understand the nature and value of any promises made to 
him," {State v. Copeland infra emphasis added). 
The Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and face this 
charge due to his lack of understanding of the evidence against him on the threatened 
murder charge. Before the trial court fulfills its duties in ensuring that the defendant 
fully understands the ramifications of his plea, the court must also determine that the 
defendant understands the possible jeopardy he might face by going ahead with the 
trial. Until this understanding is guaranteed, the trial court should not allow a plea of 
guilty to proceed. 
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND 
TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY HIS 
ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a 
two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective. "First, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some 
guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the Court 
in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a 
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did mention 
certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest" as well as a duty "to consult with the defendant on important 
decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course 
of the prosecution" (Id. at 688) Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the 
Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that the "performance 
inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the 
circumstances." (Id. at 688) 
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsels 
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was 
presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper 
discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th amendment. 
The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. In that affirmation of 
reversal the Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant 
must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that 
there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual 
prejudice. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally creditable 
enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and pervasive 
failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
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decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." [citation 
omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall 
performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the 
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's 
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional assistance in 
the respects alleged. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 
(1986)) 
In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 02-311, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that counsel's failure to investigate the extensive abuse the defendant had 
suffered through his life was unreasonable. The Court reversed his conviction on the 
grounds that this failure resulted in defense counsels inability to present this evidence 
to the sentencing jury in a capital case. The Court stated: 
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this considerable 
mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have 
returned with a different sentence. (Wiggins v. Smith at Point III) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have likewise 
rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can guide a 
determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) the Court 
found held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th Amendment violation 
constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that case, the Court 
applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial 
motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court 
denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During trial the 
officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did 
not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a defendant can show 
that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, 
the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 
351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) 
In the case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) the Utah 
Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's conviction under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move for a directed verdict after the State 
failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon permit 
during its case in chief." 
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court 
expanded the Strickland test in certain circumstances. The Court stated: 
It is true that while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for 
resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, there are 
situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness may 
affect the analysis. 
In Williams v. Taylor, the Court reversed the defendants death sentence on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the defense counsel did not investigate 
the defendant's "nightmarish childhood", nor the fact that the defendant was 
"borderline mentally retarded" (Id. at 395, 396) The Court concluded that defense 
counsel unreasonably failed to begin mitigation investigation until one week prior to 
trial, and then unreasonably failed to investigate numerous areas of mitigating 
evidence that could have benefited the defendant in the penalty phase. 
In the case of State v. Bennett 999 P.2d 1, 3, (Utah 2000) Justice Durham, in a 
concurring opinion noted: 
Tf 13 This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been 
recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 
442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of counsel case, that 
"pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we may 
presume prejudice in circumstances where it is unnecessary and ill-
advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice" 
In the present case, the representation of the Defendant taken as a whole was 
defective, and constitutionally inadequate. The defense counsels failure to provide the 
Defendant with copies of the police report coupled with the speed in which defense 
counsel pushed this matter through to plea constitutes this inadequacy. The plea was 
taken on the same day that the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing, and in light 
of the fact that he had requested a copy of the police report. Once the plea was taken, 
any value of having the police report is significantly diminished. The element of 
"fundamental fairness," addressed in Williams v. Taylor should be examined and 
adopted. 
Rule 1.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct governing lawyers provides 
in relevant part: 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to enable 
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
Clearly there was a failure by defense counsel in the present case to properly comply 
with these requirements. Defense counsel did not "promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information", nor did counsel "explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to enable the client to make informed decisions." The Defendant, through 
his motion counsel Mr. Allen told the court that: 
[T]hat whole thing caused him so much fear and concern about - about 
what maybe could happen that he didn't feel like he was paying as good 
of attention as he needed to at the time he was going through this with 
his counsel Mr. Bouwhuis. He also indicates to [argument counsel] that 
he attempted to get Mr.Bouwhuis to get him copies of his police reports. 
Oral argument counsel stated, " [t]he potential for being involved in a 
murder which he had nothing to do with and didn't want to even be 
associated with caused him a great amount of concern and — and fear 
when he got in the discussion about the plea. And that's why he jumped 
into this plea bargain, from his point of view" (R. 49 / 4). 
A defendant should not have to jump into a plea bargain under a cloud of fear 
and misunderstanding. If nothing more, plea counsel should adequately explain the 
effects of the plea, provide the defendant with relevant reports and information, and 
allow the defendant time to digest this information and come to a reasoned and logical 
decision devoid of pressure. In the present case this simply did not occur. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
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trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 
L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the 
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court 
should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as 
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and 
how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
Clearly, in the present case, if defense counsels had spent the appropriate time 
discussing the case with his client, and providing him with requested documents 
concerning his case, the plea would not have been entered. This meets the second 
prong of the Strickland test in that "the resultfs] of the proceeding would have been 
different." 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully asks this Court to reverse 
the trial courts denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, and allow him to proceed to 
trial on the case. 
DATED this 2£>day of February, 2004 
RANDALL W. RICpARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Carlos Mendez. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: This is Mr. Mendez, Your Honor. We 
have reached a plea agreement in his case. He signed an 
advance — a plea in advance of — a statement — what do you 
call that thing? He signed that statement we gave to the 
Court. 
And what he's going to be doing, Your Honor, is pleading 
guilty to a third degree felony riot. In exchange for that, 
the State has agreed not to file any other charges, including 
a murder charge they were considering. 
THE COURT: Is that the State's agreement? 
MS. NEIDER: It is, Judge. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Mendez, do you understand the agreement? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: You!ve had an opportunity to review this 
written plea agreement with your lawyer, have you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't. 
THE COURT: Did you understand everything? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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THE 
agreement? 
THE 
THE 
COURT: And 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: I'm 
did you voluntarily sign this 
Yes. 
going to ask you some questions that 
somewhat parallel what you've read in this agreement, but I'm 
required to be personally satisfied that your 
knowing and voluntary. 
First o: 
guilty to a 1 
THE 
THE 
years and a 
penalties? 
THE 
THE 
a plea of gu 
THE 
THE 
what you're 
THE 
E all, do you understand that you' 
:hird degree 
DEFENDANT : 
felony riot charge? 
Yes. 
COURT: Carries a prison sentence 
fine not to 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: Do 
ilty today? 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: You 
doing? 
DEFENDANT: 
exceed $5,000. Do you 
Yes, I do. 
you feel pressured by 
No. 
plea today is 
re pleading 
up to five 
understand the 
anyone to enter 
r mind is clear and you understand 
Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you're presumed 
under the law to be innocent of any crime until the State 
proves each element of the offense against you beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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THE COURT: You have the right to a speedy public 
trial before an impartial jury. At trial, you would have the 
right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution's 
witnesses. You'd have the right to subpoena your witnesses 
to assist you with your defense. You'd have the right to 
make a statement to the jury, or you could elect to remain 
silent. No one could compel you to give evidence against 
yourself. Do you understand each of these rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that — that if you 
plead guilty, you're waiving or giving up all of these rights 
today? 
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: Do you understand that any appeal that 
you file following sentencing will be limited in its scope 
because there's not a lot to appeal from after you've pleaded 
guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. May I have a factual basis 
for the plea? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, this is a related case to the 
case that you heard — Mr. Rios's case a couple of weeks ago. 
But Mr. Mendez is one of the four individuals that was 
present and -- and I know you're familiar with the facts, 
that all of this resulted in the death of Daniel Montgomery. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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But Mr. Mendezfs particular involvement was that he 
acknowledged to Detective Zaccardi that he approached 
Mr. Montgomery in his vehicle and spoke to him that day prior 
to any altercation. And then Mr. Montgomery — and when 
his — Mr. Montgomery and his friends came back, Mr. Mendez 
was one of the four that was there. And that he pushed one 
of the individuals in the altercation that occurred 
afterwards. And there were also fingerprints on the car that 
were Mr. Mendez!s. He was not one of the individuals that 
had a knife or a box cutter, but he was present with three 
other individuals and they engaged in the behavior that 
resulted in the death of Daniel Montgomery eventually. 
Mr. Mendez, frankly, was a little less culpable in the 
fact that he did not have a weapon and was on the other side 
of the vehicle when Mr. Montgomery got stabbed. 
THE COURT: Have you discussed this plea bargain of 
sorts with the victim1s family? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, we've discussed with the 
family -- and some of them are here today. We've discussed 
what charges would be leveled against Mr. Mendez and I've 
explained to them that he is pleading and there are no 
agreements on sentencing as far as what — as far as the plea 
is concerned. 
THE COURT: Under the circumstances, the -- the 
victim's family feels accepting of what you're proposing 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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today? 
MS. NEIDER: I think so, Judge. If you want to 
inquire of them, but we!ve had discussions about what the 
potential charges were. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: And they've understood why we made the 
decision to charge him — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: — the way that we did. 
THE COURT: All right. In order to convict you of 
this offense of riot, a third degree felony, the State would 
need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you 
simultaneously with two or more other persons engaged in 
tumultuous or violent conduct, thereby knowingly or 
recklessly creating a risk of substantial -- a substantial 
risk of causing public harm, alarm, and as a result of the 
conduct a person was — was injured — in this case killed. 
Do you understand those elements? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that your plea of 
guilty today is an admission of those elements? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Before I take your plea, do you have any 
lingering questions that you want to ask Mr. Bouwhuis at this 
moment? 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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(Off-the-record discussion between Mr. Bouwhuis and 
the defendant.) 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Did you, in fact, engage — or commit 
this crime? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. To the charge then of riot, 
a third degree felony, do you plead guilty or not guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court accepts your plea 
and finds for the record that this plea is knowing and 
voluntary. You have a right to make a motion to withdraw the 
plea if it!s made in writing within 30 days following 
sentencing. 
Do you have a recommended date for sentencing? 
PROBATION: January 9th? 
THE COURT: Sentencing will be January 9th, two 
o1clock. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Which date was that? January 9th? 
THE COURT: You're held in jail pending sentencing. 
Mr. Bouwhuis, we need to have him sign this agreement. 
It's unsigned by him. 
Mr. — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I thought he signed it. Maybe I 
didn't have him sign it. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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(Defendant signs agreement) 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Sorry about that, Judge, 
THE COURT: No problem. Thank you. 
(Proceedings conclude) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Carlos Mendez. 
This is a motion for leave to withdraw a guilty plea. I've 
read the motion and supporting memorandum. Actually, I don't 
believe there is a supporting memorandum, just a motion filed 
by the defendant. I've read the State's response. I'll hear 
argument on the motion. 
MR. ALLEN: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Mendez was 
involved in a situation that blew out of hand on him. He 
indicates that one of the problems in this case was because 
it involved that much more serious event that he was 
peripherally involved in, the discussion was continuously 
brought up to him that they — that there may be the 
potential of filing some kind of action against him that 
involved him in that murder. That was the basis for the plea 
negotiation. 
And his indication to me is that that -- that whole 
thing caused him so much fear and concern about — about uhat 
maybe could happen that he didn't feel like he was paying as 
good of attention as he needed to at the time he was going 
through this with his counsel Mr. Bouwhuis. 
He also indicates to me that he attempted to get 
Mr. Bouwhuis to get him copies of his police reports, 
although I don't show any note of that in the file until the 
prelim, which is actually when he entered the plea. 
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The plea was to a third degree riot. Under the 
circumstances of the case, the defendant has been before the 
Board and apparently they gave him a full five years on 
the — on the parole date on that five — zero to five. 
So those are basically the circumstances surrounding the 
case. I didn't get anything from Mr. Bouwhuis indicating a 
failure in the Rule 11 questionnaire that occurred before 
Your Honor in — in the court. I know this happened back 
in -- in January, so I don't think there was a statement in 
advance of plea, but I'm not sure about that. Do you have a 
statement in advance of plea in the file in this case? 
THE COURT: I do have one. 
MR. ALLEN: Oh, okay. And my recollection is at 
that time you were doing a full colloquy as well as the 
statement. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ALLEN: So I'm -- I'm assuming that the record 
will reflect that Rule 11 was complied with. I don't --
Mr. Bouwhuis didn't know of any -- any concerns on that 
regard. 
But he does — he does admit — Mr. Bouwhuis admitted to 
me that there was this discussion, and I'm not sure how that 
fits in. I guess that's part of any plea that you have that 
kind of talk. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
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MR. ALLEN: But the potential for being involved in 
a murder which he had nothing to do with and didn't want to 
even be associated with caused him a great amount of concern 
and -- and fear when he got in the discussion about the plea. 
And that's why he jumped into this plea bargain, from his 
point of view. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Allen. 
Ms. Neider? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, frankly, I know that Mr. Allen 
hasn't been involved in any of these cases, but that was a 
significant part of the negotiation and part of — as we 
dealt with these cases that he may potentially face a murder 
charge. And the State was very upfront about that with 
Mr. Bouwhuis, and I'm sure that was conveyed to him. And my 
recollection is we talked about that on the record, that that 
was part of the reason why he may be pleading. 
So I don't think that it goes to whether or not there's 
good cause for withdrawing his plea now. We were all upfront 
about what he was giving up and — but what he may 
potentially face as well if he chose to go forward and fight 
the charges or if he wanted to go forward on the charge that 
he -- was in front of him on that day. 
I didn't see that there was anything in the motion that 
qualified as good cause the fact that he was scared. It 
wasn't indicated necessarily on the record. He appeared to 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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be voluntarily entering his plea and I think that the Court 
did a very thorough Rule 11 colloquy. The Court has been 
very thorough on all of these cases surrounding this one 
event that led to the death of Mr. Montgomery. 
So, Judge, I don't think it rises to the level of good 
cause and we would ask you to deny the defendant's motion. 
MR. ALLEN: Judge — 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Off-the-record discussion between Mr. Allen and the 
defendant.) 
MR. ALLEN: He just wanted to reiterate that he had 
not had an opportunity to go through the police reports at 
that preliminary hearing. I — I don't know — typically 
Mr. Bouwhuis will go through and read the reports. This was 
a very voluminous report though and there may be some 
information in there that he did not see prior to entering 
the plea. Whether that affected him being able to enter this 
plea knowingly is the question, I think. 
So that's -- those are the issues, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Mendez, the Court denies your motion. The 
standard — the legal standard that is applied to these kind 
of cases in order to withdraw a guilty plea is that you must 
show good cause. I find no good cause in this case. 
Good cause typically occurs when the plea is entered 
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involuntarily. The file shows a plea agreement that very I 
carefully goes through the legal requirements in order for 
this Court to be satisfied that you entered a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea. I also covered with you orally those 
same matters. And I'm satisfied that having strictly 
complied with that requirement that you entered a knowing and 
voluntary plea. 
I understand your point that you feel that you felt some 
pressure and fear in facing some of these charges; no more, I 
think, than most defendants. 
Now, I recognize that this case was a murder case, but 
you did not -- but you pled to a third degree felony riot 
charge, which was a lesser charge. I understand that you may 
have felt some exposure to a more serious charge, but these 
are the things that you had an opportunity to weigh with your 
lawyer who gave you advice in this case. 
I went over — during that colloquy with you, that 
discussion that I had prior to taking your plea, I — one of 
the questions that I uniformly ask is, are you satisfied with 
the advice that your lawyer gave you? And you responded that 
you were. And now to come later and say, you know, that he 
didn!t provide you with police reports is just somewhat lame. 
So I'm not going to allow you to withdraw your plea, and 
if you want to pursue it, there are other remedies that you 
have under Rule 65(c). 
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MR. ALLEN: Thank you, Your Honor, 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Proceedings conclude) 
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